This Policy Brief summarizes the findings of a joint project between Oxford University and the Catholic University of Leuven aimed at evaluating different mechanisms for delivering collective redress. It identifies elevn principles for market regulation, and the three principal goals for collective redress of delivering compensation, affecting the future behaviour of markets, and achieving these goals in a timely and cost-efficient way.
The authors present a significant body of evidence in relation to improving enforcement generally, and collective redress in particular, and make a series of policy conclusions:
1. Redress should not be considered on its own but as an integral part of contributing to strong and competitive markets.
2. The leading contenders for these tasks are the ‘new technologies’ of regulatory and ombudsmen mechanisms.
3. Sectoral and generic regulators should have redress powers as part of their enforcement toolboxes, subject to appropriate oversight mechanisms.
4. Both sectoral legislation that requires ADR and the generic consumer ADR legislation should specify that consumer ombudsmen
models should be required, rather than other types of general ADR.
5. Traditional litigation procedures fail essential criteria of accessibility, speed, cost, efficiency, and outcomes. In comparison, newer technologies score well against those criteria, and when designed appropriately can deliver multiple objectives in relation to making markets work well and protecting consumers and businesses besides just redress.